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SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
We thank the Court for its courtesy in affording us 
this opportunity to further discuss questions raised upon 
the oral argument and other matters then mentioned but 
not argued. 
Before analyzing the illustration suggested at the oral 
argument or adapting it to the facts and statute here 
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involved, we shall refer to a few fundamental propos,itions 
concerning which there can be no possible controversy. 
SECTION 80-5-66, U. C. A. 1943 
Section 80-5-66, U. C. A. 1943, was enacted in its 
present form by Section 3 of Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 
1937, and requires exaction of an occupation tax "equal 
to one per cent of the gross amount received for or the 
gross value of metalliferous ore sold." It expressly provides 
in subsection (a) that where the ore or metals "is sold 
under a bona fide contract of sale the amount of money 
or its equivalent actually received by the owner * * * 
from the sale" less a reasonable transportation cost "from 
the place where mined to the place where, under the con-
tmct of sa,le the ore is to be delivered" shall be the basis 
for computing the tax. In order to avoid discrimination 
as between the independent producer and the producer 
treating its own ores, it is provided in subsection (b) that 
the disposal by the producer operating his own production 
works "shall be treated as a sale within the meaning of 
this section for the purpose of determining gross proceeds 
or otherwise," and that in such determination rates and 
charges, etc. applicable to ores of like character from 
independent sources shall be applied. 
1 t would seem clear that the section had and has two 
vital objectives: ( 1) the fixing of a yardstick for determ-
ining the tax; and (2) the avoidance of any discrimination 
as between the independent producer and the producer 
treating its own ores. 
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WHAT IS THE YARDSTICK? 
Of course no one has contended or will contend that 
the Legislature failed in its effort to avoid discrimination 
as between the independent producer and the producer 
treating its own ores or that the yardstick used in measuring 
the occupation tax of one should not be used in measuring 
that of the other. The controversy centers about the nature 
and identity of the yardstick. Since it is admitted that 
each independent producer sold its ore or metals "under 
a bona fide contract of sale" and that the gross amount 
"actually received" by it from the purchaser was as con-
tended by it and as set forth in its report to the Tax Com-
mission less a reasonable transportation cost "from the 
place where mined to the place where, under the contract 
of sale," the ore was delivered, and since, pursuant to said 
subsection (b), the tax of other respondents must be 
measured by the same yardstick, there is obviously no 
basis for the contention of appellants, unless the subsidy 
payments were a part of the money "actually received 
* * from the sale," consummated as in the statute 
provided, "under· a bona fide contract of sale." 
What "contract of sale" was ever entered into by any 
respondent other than its contract of sale with the pur-
chaser as alleged by it and admitted by appellants? What 
"contract of sale" or other document or instrument except 
those alleged by respondents contained any provision as 
to where "the ore is to be delivered" or would throw any 
light on the proper deduction to be made for transportation 
"from the place where mined to the place where, under the 
contract of sale. the ore is to be delivered"? 
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Long before the mine occupation tax law was enacted the 
Utah Legislature defined in our Uniform Sales Act what 
it means when it speaks of a contract to sell goods as 
follows: 
"A contract to sell goods is a contract whereby 
the seller agrees to transfer the property in goods 
to the buyer for a consideration called the price." 
It thus defines a sale of goods: 
"A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the 
seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer 
for a consideration called the price." 
Confessedly the receipt or payment of any subsidy was 
not a term or condition of any contract of sale, was of no 
concern to any purchaser, and the passing of title in and to 
ores or metals under or pursuant to any contract of sale 
was in no manner dependent on or affected by any subsidy 
payment. In the case of the independent producer title 
to the ores passed to the purchaser before application for 
the payment of any premiums could even be made and it 
is not claimed that it was ever the condition of any contract 
of sale that if premiums were not paid the sale might be 
rescinded. In the case of ores mined by companies which 
also processed them-smelting or reduction companies-
premiums were paid long before the metals recovered from 
the ores were even available for sale and it is not claimed 
that Metals Reserve Company had any right to demand 
the return of the premiums paid in the event such metals 
were not subsequently sold. 
As we read the Act, every pertinent clause or section 
unmistakably discloses the intent of the Legislature to 
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make the "basis for computing the occupation tax imposed 
by this act" the purchase price paid by the buyer under 
his contract of sale with the seller, after deducting trans-
portation cost of the ore "from the place where mined to 
the place where, under the contract of sale," the ore was 
delivered; that intent is shown and confirmed by Section 
80-5-55, U. C. A. 1943, originally enacted in its present 
form by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 1937, which directs 
the State Tax Commission to prepare an "Occupation Tax 
and Assessment Book of Mines, in which must be entered 
all occupation taxes fixed and the assessment of all mines." 
Naturally the entries in that "Book" would identify the 
basis of the tax. The basis for the occupation tax here in-
volved is thus identified in subsection (6) of Section 80-
5-55: 
"(6) Amount received for ore and metal if 
sold; if not sold, the value thereof." 
By the later sections above cited care is taken to 
insure against fraud or overreaching by the provision that 
the contract under which the ore is sold must be "a bona 
fide contract of sale." Understanding human nature and 
realizing that in the absence of fraud a producer would 
not enter into a contract for the sale of his ore unless the 
agreed purchase price fairly represented its market value, 
it is neither unnatural nor unreasonable that the Legisla-
ture was willing to fix as the yardstick for measuring the 
tax the purchase price received by the seller "under a bona 
fide contract of sale," less the transportation cost above 
mentioned. 
We do not know of any contract of sale to which any 
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respondent was a party that had not been entered into and 
was not in full force and effect at and prior to the time 
when subsidies began. Such contracts of sale have been an 
essential and universally known incident to our mining 
industry from the beginning and are identified in the statute 
as clearly as the English language will permit. Both 
ancient usage and the express words of the Act unmistak-
ably tie the yardstick to such contracts of sale if "bona 
fide" and limit an occupation tax to one per cent of the 
amount received "under," that is to say pursuant to the 
terms and provisions of, such contracts, less the specified 
deduction. 
Under what legal principle or rule of construction could 
the payment of a subsidy or other reward by an utter 
stranger to the contract of sale change or in any manner 
affect that contract or any agreement of the parties thereto 
or increase or decrease the purchase price or the amount 
"actually received" pursuant thereto? Had the Govern-
ment failed to pay any promised subsidy, would such failure 
have prevented a passing of title from the seller to the 
buyer as contemplated in the contract of sale or would 
it have affected the right of either to enforce every term 
and provision of the contract as written, precisely as if 
no subsidy had ever been promised, paid, or unpaid? 
THE ILLUSTRATION DISCUSSED AT THE ORAL 
ARGUMENT 
As we understood and recall, the substance of the 
illustration used upon the oral argument was: 
"A father feels that his son is lazy and wants 
7 
to induce him to be more diligent. Ordinarily 2400 
hours would be worked in a year. The father says 
to the son: 'For every hour you work in excess 
of 1500 hours in the year I will pay you an amount 
equal to that you receive from your employer.' Is 
the money received from his father derived from the 
son's labor? Is it wages? Should it be considered 
in arriving at the 'value' of the son's labor?" 
In the illustrated case it doubtless is assumed that if 
the son had not complied with the conditions specified in the 
father's offer he would have not received any payment from 
his father and that he did receive payment as a result of 
his compliance. But it does not seem to us that the pay-
ments made by the father constituted "wages" and pre-
sumably the "value" of the son's services was reflected in 
the wages paid by the employer. Clearly the amount paid 
by the father would not be taken into account in computing 
premiums on Workmen's Compensation or contributions 
and deductions to be made under Social Security and Un-
employment Compensation laws. The payments made by 
the father could not be deducted in computing his net in-
come, since the son was neither a charitable nor educational 
institution. 
But, regardless of what may be the correct answer 
(either Yes or No) to each of the questions propounded in the 
illustration, we cannot see how that answer can be material 
in deciding any question to be determined in the cases at 
bar. It does seem to us that similar facts, if applied to an 
occupation tax statute like that here involved, very aptly 
illustrate why the contributions of the father to his son 
could not be included or considered in computing an occupa-
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tion tax exacted from the son as a condition to his right 
to follow his vocation. 
Let us assume: that the son was a small rancher or 
farmer who confined his entire herd to fifty sheep by dis-
posing of all his lambs and preventing any increase beyond 
the quota of fifty; that his father had the laudable desire to 
make the son a successful sheepman and to accomplish that 
end told his son that he would give him a dollar for each 
sheep by which he would increase his herd in addition to 
the original fifty; and that, spurred by this incentive, the 
son saves his lambs, increases his herd to one hundred and 
fifty sheep and, for the one hundred head increase, receives 
from his father $100 cash in complete fulfillment of the 
father's promise. Let us also assume that the Legislature 
has seen fit to enact an occupation tax law applicable to 
sheep raisers like the son with provisions like those of the 
statute involved on these appeals, the tax being computed 
at a percentage of the amount "actually received" by sheep 
raisers "from the sale of all" sheep during the calendar 
year. Later the son decides that one hundred and fifty 
sheep are too many for him and sells to the butcher twenty-
five of his original herd and twenty-five of the added one 
hundred sheep of identical kind and character, all at the 
same price per head. In computing the tax should the Tax 
Commission include the $100 paid by the father as a part 
of the money or its equivalent "actually received" by the 
son "from the sale" of the sheep? It is true that without 
these rewards he probably would not have increased his 
production of sheep over that of previous years. It is true 
that the rewards increased his income. But the fact still 
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remains that the only money or its equivalent received "from 
the sale" or "under" any "contract of sale" was that paid by 
the butcher. The rewards were made for production of 
sheep, just as appellants accurately state on page 29 of their 
brief: "The premium payments were made for production 
of ore." Although the State Tax Commission might think 
that the Legislature gravely erred in tying the yardstick 
to the consideration received from the sale of sheep and 
should have provided that it be computed on an income 
basis, such thought, whether right or wrong, could not 
repeal or modify the statute. 
If there were a meat shortage such as we have suf-
fered during recent years and the Goverment, in an effort 
to increase the supply, offered and paid the same rewards 
as those offered and paid by the father, the meaning, force 
and effect of the occupation ,tax statute would remain un-
changed and the amount of the tax payable would not be 
increased, diminished or otherwise affected by the subsidy 
payments. 
CONCERNING "VALUE" 
Of course it was the intention of the Legislature that 
the amount received by the seller pursuant to the contract 
of sale should fairly represent the value of the ore or metals 
sold. The purpose of the provision that the amount received 
by the seller, upon which the one per cent t?.x might be 
levied, shall be proceeds from ore or metals "sold under a 
bona fide contract of sale," is manifest. By any known 
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definition of value, the full value of respondents' ores and 
metals was the top price received by them. It is not only 
stipulated that all ores and metals were sold under bona fide 
contracts of sale but, from the admitted facts, it conclusive-
ly appears that any higher price would have been unlawful. 
The ceiling prices on metals were all fixed at the top price 
then available in a free and uncontrolled market. Those 
ceilings were lawfully established. Only a crystal-gazer 
will attempt to guess what the price might have been had 
no ceilings been fixed. The assessment here complained of 
and the yardstick applied in arriving at the tax do not and 
could not rest in whole or in part upon any guess as to what 
the price of metals might have been in a free market during 
the year 1943. 
We believe the observa,tions of the Montana court in 
the Klies case, from which we quote at length on pages 
23-8 of our original brief, and other illustrations there em-
ployed by us, aptly demonstrate not only why the subsidy 
payments are no part of the amount received by the owner 
"from the sale," but why they could have no possible mater-
iality in arriving at the value of respondents' ore and metals. 
In this connection we think it worth while to again refer to 
the son who was induced to increase his herd of sheep be-
cause of rewards offered by the father or the Government. 
If the butcher "under a bona fide contract of sale" was will-
ing to pay the top market price and as great a price as could 
be lawfully exacted, it would be difficult to convince him 
or any other purchaser that the sheep were worth more than 
that top price. Neither he nor any other buyer would be 
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able to understand why the twenty-five purchased sheep 
which were a part of the original herd did not have as great 
"value" as the twenty-five purchased sheep of identical kind 
and character which came from the increase over 1the fixed 
quota. The butcher or any other buyer would be unable to 
see how or why rewards paid by the father or the Govern-
ment could or should affect the matter of "value" or be a part 
of or in any manner related to "the amount of money or its 
equivalent actually received by the owner ... from the sale 
of" sheep. For a further discussion of this phase of the case 
we invite attention to our original brief at pages 29-31. 
Since equality of purchase price and value must have 
been contemplated by the Legislature, that equality would 
necessarily be impossible if the subsidies were included as 
a part of the purchase price. This is true because on no 
possible theory could an amount paid as a subsidy be added 
to the purchase price paid by the butcher or smelter, in 
arriving at the "value" of the goods sold. Therefore if "the 
amount of money or its equivalent actually received by the 
owner ... from the sale" were construed to include not only 
the amount actually received from the sale, but also the sub-
sidies, the contemplated equality between ,the amount re-
ceived from the sale and "value" could not exist. Under 
such a construction of the statute, a respondent who sold 
his ore for a purchase price of $50,000 and received sub-
sidies aggregating $10,000 would be deemed to have "actu-
ally received ... from the sale" of his ore $50,000 plus 
$10,000, to wit, $60,000, whereas manifestly the "value" of 
his ore was $50,000 only. 
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SUBSIDIES ARE NOT PROCEEDS "FROM THE SALE" 
OF ORES OR METALS 
Since there were no quotas, no subsidy payments, and 
not even a war when our Occupation Tax Act was passed, 
it cannot be said that the Legislature intended to impose an 
occupation tax on subsidy payments. However, that fact is 
no reason for excluding them if the language of the statute 
is broad enough to include them. They were also unknown 
and not foreseen by the Legislature when it enacted our 
income tax law. But they were and are a part of the "in-
come" of those who receive them and are properly taxable 
under our income tax law. The fact that uranium may not 
have been known or supposed to exist in the State and that 
the Legislature could not have foreseen that there would 
ever be any income from its production or proceeds from 
its sale would not prevent full application of our occupation 
tax law to proceeds from the sale of uranium ore, because it 
is metalliferous ore and proceeds from its sale are therefore 
subject to the tax. We have no quarrel with a rule of 
statutory construction permitting taxation under facts and 
statutes like those just indicated. But that rule has no 
application in the cases at bar. As already indicated and 
universally known, contracts for the sale of metalliferous 
ores and metals are and always have been instruments of 
a definite character pursuant to which title in ores and 
metals is transferred from the seller to the buyer for a 
consideration therein specified and agreed upon by the 
parties to the contract. Under the "bona fide contract of 
sale" which the Legislature definitely identifies in the 
statute, the "money or its equivalent actually received by 
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the owner * * * from the sale" did not include and 
could not have been intended to include any reward or 
benefit voluntarily conferred by the Government or by some 
friend or father of the seller which was in no way furnished 
or induced by the purchaser and was not paid or payable 
under any contract of sale. And the yardstick of the statute 
is unmistakably tied to the contracts of sale therein men-
tioned. 
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